The Phenomenical Character of Dispositional Properties
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15359/px1.87-88-21209Keywords:
phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, dispositional properties, beliefs, desires, epistemic role of consciousness, brain states, perceptionAbstract
This paper delves into the nature of dispositional properties, such properties has been of a recent interest in the philosophy of mind and metaphysical debates, however its role and nature has not been clear. I shall argue that such properties determine our behavior once the phenomenal and intentional properties have been realized by the relevant brain states, thus, it is explore the role of disposition in a way that determine our behavior base on the epistemic role of consciousness to represent our beliefs and desires, the base of this argument lies on the idea that most of our mental properties are phenomenal, and our perceptual process is regulate via an indirect realism, hence will be argue that what it is required for dispositional properties are the realization first of phenomenonological-intenciontal properties.
References
Carruthers P. y Veillet B. (2007). The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 221-236.
Bourget, D., & Mendelovici, A. (2019 ). Phenomenal Intentionality. Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/>
Brentano. (2009 (1874)). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Massachusetts. MIT Press.
Drestke, F. (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Giorgio Ganis, William L. Thompson , Stephen M. Kosslyn. (2004). Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception: an fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 226-241.
Gonzalez Estrada, A. (2018). On the phenomenal, intentional and physical nature of the mind.
PhD Thesis, Forthcoming, Keele University.
Ganis, G., Thompson, W., & S, K. (2004). Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception: an fMRI study. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, 2(20), 226-241. doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.02.012.
Giorgio Ganis, William L. Thompson , Stephen M. Kosslyn. (2004). Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception: an fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 226-241.
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 31–52. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In D. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (pp. 520--533). New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Kriegel, U. (2002). Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis, 175-198.
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly(64), 354-361.
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly, 143-158.
Loar, B. (1990). Phenomenal States. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 81–108. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2214188
Loar, B. (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In M. H. (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge (pp. 229--258). New York: A Bradford Book.
Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 1–8. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2220143
McKitrick, J. (2018). Dispositional Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mendelovici, A. (2018). The phenomenal basis of intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 4(83), 435–450. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
Papineau, D. (1993). Philosphical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Perry, J. (2001). Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet. (2007). The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 221-236.
Putnam, H. (1987). The Many Faces of Realism. Illinois: Open Court LaSalle.
Schwarz, W. (2015). Analityc Functionalism. In B. L. (eds.), A companion to David Lewis (pp. 504-518). West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.
Strawson, P. (1959). Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen : University Paperbacks.
Sturgeon, S. (1994). The Epistemic View of Subjectivity. The Journal of Philosophy, 5(91), 221–235. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2940751
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Allan González Estrada
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
La revista trabaja bajo la Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional; apartir de la publicación número 79 (2019); en publicaciones anteriores se trabajaba bajo una Licencia Atribución- No Comercial- Sin Derivadas 4.0 Internacional.
